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Abstract
This paper investigates competitiveness in the Ukrainian stock market during local cri-
sis of 2013–2015. The following hypothesis is tested: crisis decreases competitiveness in 
the stock market. The analysis is carried out for the most liquid stocks in the Ukrainian 
Exchange (UX) over the period from 2010 to 2017 using both traditional measure-
ments of market concentration (Hirschman Index, Lerner Index, Comprehensive 
Concentration Index, Entropy Index, Gini coefficient, etc.) and some alternative meth-
ods like regression analysis with dummy variables and Kruskal-Wallis test. The results 
suggest that the current degradation of the Ukrainian stock market is closely related 
with significant changes in the market concentration which are caused by the local 
crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
Stock market provides a significant impact on the economy of the 
country. Beck et al. (2015) using correlation analysis find evidences 
in favor of strong dependence between the trade volumes in the stock 
market and economic growth. Growth of the EU stock market by 1/3 
causes long-term growth of the economy by 1/5. But this dependence 
is absent for the case of less developed countries.
The last decade was very painful for the Ukrainian stock market. 
Internal and external shocks, global financial crisis of 2007–2009, end 
of the commodity super cycle hurt all the segments of the financial 
market and stock market as well during 2008–2010.
As a result, in 2012, Ukraine was ranked 2nd (after Cyprus) in the world 
as the country with the biggest decline of stock market. Ukrainian 
stock market lost 35% of capitalization during 2012. Degradation of 
the stock market continued in 2013–2015. It was caused by the Russian 
aggression, devaluation of Hryvnia (Ukrainian national currency), 
catastrophic decline in international reserves, local banking crisis, 
and sharp decline in GDP, etc. 
In such conditions, Ukrainian stock market finally ceased to perform 
its basic functions and turned into a pale shadow of itself. Its role in 
2016–2017 was reduced to a purely nominal – to show that Ukraine 
has stock market. These processes are extremely negative for the whole 
Ukrainian economy; that is why it is quite important to understand 
their real causes. In this paper, the following hypothesis is tested: cri-
sis decreases competitiveness in the stock market.
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To do this, competitiveness in the Ukrainian stock market is investigated. The analysis is carried out for 
the most liquid stocks in the Ukrainian Exchange (UX) over the period from 2010 to 2017. To measure 
market concentration, traditional measurements of market concentration (Hirschman Index, Lerner 
Index, Comprehensive Concentration Index, Entropy Index, Gini coefficient, etc.) and some alternative 
methods like regression analysis with dummy variables and Kruskal-Wallis test are used. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the existing literature on the mar-
ket concentration analysis and Ukrainian stock market. Section 2 describes the methodology used in 
this study. Section 3 discusses the empirical results. Last section provides some concluding remarks and 
implications.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Competition in the stock market is widely dis-
cussed among academicians. Still there is no 
any unified methodology or overall theory for it. 
Expressed views are rather polar: from the ab-
solutism of stock market as a highly competitive 
structure with optimal resource distribution to 
the justification of monopoly nature of the stock 
market. Overall existing studies can be divided 
into 3 groups:
1. Optimal resource allocation and high com-
petitiveness in the stock market. Merton and 
Subrahmanyam (1974) demonstrated the op-
timality of a competitive stock market, using 
Pareto optimum and restrictive limitations for 
the companies. Stiglitz (1981) also discussed 
Pareto optimality and competition in the USA 
stock market. Soros (1994) and Madhavan 
(1996) prove the positive role of the competi-
tiveness for the stock markets.
2. Market microstructure models and competi-
tive models in the stock market. Grossman 
and Hart (1979) explore competitive equilib-
rium in the stock market. Talmain (2007) de-
veloped a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium approach to study monopolistic compe-
tition in the stock market. Models of the com-
petitive stock trading are developed by Wang 
(1994), Huffman (1987), Campbell et al. (1993), 
Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Dumas (1989) 
and others. Insider trading models, manipu-
lation models and other models based on un-
equal information distribution are proposed 
by Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), 
Foster and Viswanathan (1990, 1993), Dalko 
et al. (2016), Maxim and Ashif (2017). 
3. Competition in the segments of the stock mar-
ket is discussed by Smidt (1971) who analyzed 
the conditions of the effective competitiveness. 
Cantillona and Yinb (2011) explore competi-
tion between exchanges and how the organi-
zational model of stock exchange can influ-
ence the competitiveness in the market. 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
stock markets are efficient and as a result, they 
are highly competitive. Still, there are many evi-
dences in the academic literature in favor of the 
opposite. To assess concentration of the market, 
both special indicators (Hirschey, 2008; Naldi & 
Flamini, 2014) and statistical models can be used 
(Mynhardt et al., 2017).
Ukrainian stock market as a rather young struc-
ture was recently analyzed mostly from the po-
sition of market anomalies: calendar anomalies 
(Caporale & Plastun, 2017) and the weekend effect 
(Caporale et al., 2016), overreactions (Mynhardt & 
Plastun, 2013). As a result, for the Ukrainian stock 
market, there are no specific models or method-
ologies to assess concentration. And still there are 
no complex studies devoted to the competitive-
ness of the Ukrainian stock market. 
At the same time, the case of the Ukrainian stock 
market is rather interesting, because it provides 
the most recent evidences of stock market degra-
dation in the world. For example, trade volumes in 
the Ukrainian Exchange (one of the leading stock 
exchanges in Ukraine) declined by 30 times (see 
Figure 1) and stock markets actually stopped per-
forming their basic functions.
Sharp decrease in the volumes is accompanied by 
the market monopolization both for the case of or-
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ganizers (Table 1), financial instruments (Table 2), 
issuers and depositary/clearing institutions. 
As can be seen in Table 1, stock market volume was 
concentrated in the stock exchange “Perspective” 
during last years. There were two types of reasons: 
1) sharp increase in government bond trading vol-
ume; 2) cancellation of licenses of PFTS and UX. 
This is rather unique situation for the modern eco-
nomic systems. That is why its anatomy is quite 
important. In this study the whole specter of 
cause-effect relationships wouldn’t be discussed. It 
will be concentrated on the very concrete aspect: 
competitiveness. Hypothesis to be tested: crisis 
decreases competitiveness in the stock market.
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study is based on the data from the Ukrainian 
Exchange (http://www.ux.ua/) for the period 
2010–2017. The choice of the period is explained 
by the following reasons: start of degradation 
phase, data availability. To assess the competitive-
ness of the market trade volumes, the key issuers 
are used. The list of issuers (Appendix B) is based 
on the structural analysis of the trades. To do this, 
data from two periods (extreme points for the 
trade volumes in the Ukrainian stock market) are 
used: 2011 and 2017. Companies which break the 
threshold of round 1% get in the list. Structural 
analysis of the trade volumes is presented in 
Appendix A.
Figure 1. Trade volumes in the Ukrainian Exchange during 2010–2017 (UAH)
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Table 1. Structure of the Ukrainian stock market by organizers in 2008–2015, %
Stock exchange 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Perspective 3.64 32.40 27.29 33.58 55.21 67.23 79.15 76.98
PFTS 90.02 39.62 46.46 37.74 33.93 23.78 15.47 18.58
UX 0.00 9.33 20.95 26.96 9.11 2.35 1.38 2.34
Others – 18.65 5.3 1.72 1.75 6.64 4 2.1
Overall 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 2. Structure of the Ukrainian stock market by financial instruments in 2008–2016, %
Financial 
instrument 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Stocks 31.1 37.6 33.3 29.1 8.2 9.2 4.2 2.0 0.8
Bonds 44.0 19.6 5.1 9.1 10.0 10.0 5.4 4.7 2.9
Government bonds 22.6 22.7 46.4 42.1 67.8 74.7 87.9 87.1 84.8
Investment 
certificates 0.5 19.8 12.3 9.4 2.2 1.3 0.6 0.9 0.6
Others 1.8 0.3 2.9 10.3 11.8 4.8 1.9 5.3 10.9
Overall 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Tested hypothesis is as follows: crisis decreases 
competitiveness in the stock market. 
To test this hypothesis, methodology developed 
by Mynhardt et al. (2017) is used. It includes both 
specific indicators used to analyze the competi-
tiveness of the market (Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI), Rosenbluth Index, Comprehensive 
Concentration Index (CCI), Lorenz curve, Gini 
coefficient, Entropy Index, The Lerner Index, con-
centration ratio, etc.) and additional statistical 
techniques (Kruskal-Wallis test, regression analy-
sis with dummy variables) to increase authenticity 
of the results.
At the first stage of analysis, some specific statisti-
cal tests are used. They provide preliminary evi-
dences in favor of the tested hypothesis. Data are 
divided into groups which are checked for the af-
filiation to the same general population. 
To define the class of the statistical tests to be used 
(parametric or non-parametric tests), data set 
needs to be checked for normality. 
To do this, Pearson’s and Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
criteria are applied. The results are presented in 
Table 3. Since the critical values exceed calculated 
values of the Pearson’s and Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
criteria, it may be concluded that data are not nor-
mally distributed and therefore only non-para-
metric tests are valid.
Table 3. “Normality” test of the data
Parameter Value
Chi-square 337
Chi-square distribution critical value 
(p = 0.95) 242
Null hypothesis Rejected
Kolmogorov-Smirnov d 0.28
Kolmogorov-Smirnov critical value 
(p = 0.95, n = 208) 0.0943
Null hypothesis Rejected
Conclusion Data are not normally distributed
That is why in this study, Kruskal-Wallis test is 
used. It is used instead of Mann-Whitney test be-
cause of the large number of the analyzed groups.
The null hypothesis (H0) in each case is that the 
data belong to the same population, a rejection of 
the null representing the differences in the ana-
lyzed groups of data (groups are uneven) and, thus, 
market is not freely competitive. 
As an additional element to confirm the Kruskal-
Wallis test results, multiple regression analysis 
with dummy variables is used. Overall model is 
presented below:
0 1 1 2 2 ... ,t t t n nt tY a a D a D b D ε= + + + + +  (1)
where tY  – value on the period ;t  0a  – mean value 
for the whole generation population (Ukrainian 
stock market); na  – mean value for specific 
data group (certain company); ntD  – dummy vari-
able for specific data group, equal to 0 or 1. ntD  is 1 
when data belong to the specific group (for exam-
ple, data belong to company with ticker BAVL and 
specific data group is BAVL). ntD  is 0 when data 
don’t belong to the specific group (for example, da-
ta characterize CEEN, but specific data group is 
BAVL); tε  – random error term for period .t
The size, sign and statistical significance of the 
dummy coefficients provide information about 
possible differences between groups. If dummy 
coefficient is statistically significant (p < 0.05), it is 
concluded that this group belongs to another gen-
eral population. And this indirectly evidences in 
favor of unevenness of the Ukrainian stock market.
If the preliminary statistical assessments gen-
erate evidence in favor of the tested hypothesis 
(Ukrainian stock market is non-competitive), the 
next stage of the analysis is started – quantitative 
assessments of the competitiveness. To do this, 
specific indicators are used. 
Concentration ratio
Concentration ratio is used to measure the level of 
market control of the largest firms in the market 
and to illustrate the degree to which market is oli -
gopolistic. The concentration ratio is the percenth-
age of market share held by the largest n  firms in 
an industry.
1 2 ... ,nCRn R R R= + + +  (2)
where CRn  – concentration ratio; n  – the num-
ber of the largest market participants; iR  – share 
of the market held by the -thi  participant.
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Depending on the value of the ,CR  the level of 
market competition can be characterized as fol-
lows (based on Naldi & Flamini, 2014):
• 0% – no concentration. Means perfect 
competition;
• 0%-50% – low concentration. Depending 
on concrete size of the CR market competi-
tion ranges from perfect competition to an 
oligopoly;
• 50%-80% – medium concentration. Usually 
is typical for the oligopoly;
• 80%-100% – high concentration. Market 
ranges from an oligopoly to monopoly;
• 100% – total concentration. The market is 
monopoly.
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (ННІ)
HHI is used to measure the size of firms in relation 
to the whole market. This is an indicator of the 
competition level in the market.
2
1
.
n
i
i
R
HHI
R=
 =   ∑  (3)
It ranges in the interval [0; 1] (based on Hirschey, 
2008):
• 0 – no concentration; 
• from 0 to 0.1 – low concentration; 
• from 0.10 to 0.18 – medium concentration; 
• above 0.18 – high concentration.
Rosenbluth Index
The Rosenbluth Index includes not only the firm 
market share, but also the firm rank.
( )
1
1
.
2 1
R n
i
i
I
i R
=
=
⋅ ⋅ −∑  (4)
The Rosenbluth Index deviates in the range [1/n; 
1]. The higher the value of the Index, the more mo-
nopolized the market is.
Comprehensive Concentration  
Index (CCI)
Comprehensive Concentration Index reflects both 
relative dispersion and absolute magnitude of the 
biggest market participant share.
( )( )21
2
1 1 .
n
i i
i
CCI R R R
=
= + ⋅ + −∑  (5)
CCI  ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the ,CCI  the 
less competitive is market.
Entropy Index
The Entropy Index is a measure of “evenness” – 
the extent to which groups are evenly distributed 
among organizational units. It can also be inter-
preted as the difference between the diversity (en-
tropy) of the system and the weighted average di-
versity of individual units, expressed as a fraction 
of the total diversity of the system.
1
1 1ln .n i
i i
E R
n R=
= ⋅∑  (6)
Small values of the Entropy Index reflect high 
concentration.
Gini coefficient
The Gini coefficient measures the inequality 
among values of a frequency distribution (for ex-
ample, market shares).
1 1
2
.
2
n n
i j
i j
R R
G
n R
= =
−
=
∑∑
 (7)
The Gini coefficient deviates from 0 (perfect com-
petition in the market) to 1 (monopoly). 
As additional indicator of market inequality, the 
Lorenz curve is used. It provides the visual (graph) 
interpretation of the market unevenness. The cumu-
lative percentage of companies is plotted on the x-
axis, the cumulative percentage of market share is on 
the y-axis. In theory, absolutely equal distribution of 
the market is characterized by the bisector coming 
out of the start point of the coordinate system. The 
more actual distribution deviates from the theoreti-
cal empirical distribution, the greater the degree of 
inequality is observed in the market.
34
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 15, Issue 2, 2018
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
First, the structure of the trades in the Ukrainian 
Stock Exchange for the case of issuers during the 
most extreme periods (years with maximum and 
minimum trades) – 2011 and 2017 is analyzed. 
Results are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
Simple visual analysis shows significant changes 
in the structure of trades. The level of competitive-
ness between issuers decreased dramatically. As a 
result, in 2017, investors mostly have no investment 
alternatives. This partially explains sharp decline 
in trade volumes in the Ukrainian stock market. 
Next statistical tests to confirm/reject hypoth-
esis about non-competitiveness nature of the 
Ukrainian stock market are provided.
Kruskal-Wallis test
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis test are presented in 
Table 4.
Table 4. Kruskal-Wallis test results
Parameter Values
Adjusted H 177.02
d.f. 24
P-value 0.0000
Critical value 36.41
Null hypothesis Rejected
As can be seen, data from different companies be-
long to the different general populations. This is 
indirect evidence in favor of the non-competitive-
ness of the Ukrainian stock market.
Regression analysis with dummy 
variables
Results of the regression analysis with dummy 
variables are presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Regression analysis results 
Variables Coefficients (B) t p-level
Average 0 8.40674 0.000000
ALMK 4.86077 2.34411 0.020106
AVDK 4.02006 1.93868 0.054022
AZST 0.54099 0.26089 0.794458
BAVL 0.73176 0.35289 0.724562
CEEN 7.75263 3.73872 0.000245
DNON –3.31257 –1.59749 0.111818
DOEN –1.32762 –0.64024 0.522785
ENMZ 0.51264 0.24722 0.805004
FARM –2.64636 –1.27621 0.203440
KVBZ –2.82401 –1.36188 0.174847
LTPL –2.84770 –1.37330 0.171276
LUAZ –3.17167 –1.52954 0.127794
MSICH 12.85456 6.19913 0.000000
PAAZ –3.31446 –1.59840 0.111615
ROSA –2.91238 –1.40450 0.161803
SHCHZ –3.12500 –1.50704 0.133462
SVGZ –2.35429 –1.13536 0.257654
SNEM –3.39566 –1.63756 0.103168
STIR –1.62252 –0.78246 0.434918
TATM –3.28627 –1.58481 0.114672
SGOK –2.19249 –1.05733 0.291704
UNAF 5.09849 2.45876 0.014837
USCB 1.40904 0.67951 0.497641
UTLM –0.70703 –0.34096 0.733508
YASK –1.86680 –0.90027 0.369117
Other 3.09199 1.49112 0.137589
Figure 2. Structure of trades in the Ukrainian Stock Exchange: case of issuers in 2011
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Regression summary: 
R = 0.57; R2 = 0.33; Adjusted R2 = 0.24.
F(26,190) = 3.61; p < 0.0000.
According to these results, ALMK, CEEN, MSICH 
and UNAF data differ from the other companies 
and average values of the market. This evidences 
in favor of inequality in the Ukrainian stock mar-
ket by the trade volumes between issuers and its 
high concentration. 
Overall statistical tests provide evidences in favor 
of the non-competitiveness of the Ukrainian stock 
market.
To confirm these conclusions, some special indi-
cators to measure market concentration are used. 
Indicators of market concentration
Results of the of the market concentration indi-
cators (concentration ratio (CR1), concentration 
ratio (CR4), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
Rosenbluth Index, Comprehensive Concentration 
Index (ССІ), Entropy Index and Gini coefficient) 
analysis are presented in Table 6.
To provide visual interpretation of the inequality 
of the Ukrainian stock market, the Lorenz curve 
is used (see Figure 4). Results evidence in favor of 
the inequality in the Ukrainian stock market and 
confirm the hypothesis of the non-competitive-
ness of the market.
General results of concentration indicators analy-
sis are presented in Table 7.
As can be seen, level of competitiveness in the 
Ukrainian stock market changes dramatically. 
It was not highly competitive earlier, but dur-
ing 2010–2017, it almost turned into oligopoly 
(case of trade volumes). It is divided between 
small numbers of issuers. Nowadays, opportu-
nities to invest in liquid stocks are limited with 
3-4 positions. As a result, it is mostly impossible 
to create a diversified investment portfolio. This 
Figure 3. Structure of trades in the Ukrainian Stock Exchange: case of issuers in 2017
1%
29%
26%
2%
1%
1%
1%
14%
1%
2%
1%
4% 6%
1%
1%
9%
ALMK BAVL
CEEN DNON
DOEN KVBZ
LUAZ MSICH
PAAZ SHCHZ
SNEM TATM
UNAF USCB
UTLM Others
Table 6. Indicators of market concentration, 2010–2017
Indicator 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Concentration ratio (CR1), % 15.25 17.58 24.16 33.10 33.59 29.02 40.41 25.94
Concentration ratio (CR4), % 41.06 50.09 61.56 55.48 76.64 75.82 82.00 75.97
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.19
Rosenbluth Index 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.20
Comprehensive Concentration 
Index (ССІ) 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.33
Entropy Index, % 10.57 10.28 9.25 8.77 7.64 7.77 7.00 7.89
Gini coefficient 0.42 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.68 0.65 0.72 0.64
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negates the idea of investing in the Ukrainian 
stock market.
Overall, we find convincing confirmations of the 
basic idea: crisis decreases competitiveness in the 
stock market. 
Ukrainian stock market needs urgent attention 
to prevent its total degradation. Analysis of the 
government programs for the Ukrainian stock 
market development (for example, the most re-
cent one which is called “European choice – new 
possibilities for the progress and growth” and was 
developed for 2015–2017) shows no understand-
ing from the authorities of the importance of the 
competitiveness in the stock market. In this legal 
act, almost everything can be found: from the in-
vestment stimulation measures to the infrastruc-
ture development. But there is nothing about the 
competitiveness. 
Still, state regulation is one of the key elements 
of the market development. Market failures, ma-
nipulations, speculative activities, and monopoly 
regulation – all these aspects are quite impor-
tant for the market development and ensuring 
competitiveness.
International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) developed Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation. Among them 
are: Principles Relating to the Regulator, for Self-
Regulation, for the Enforcement of Securities 
Regulation, for Cooperation in Regulation Principles 
for Issuers and some others. Their implementation 
in the Ukrainian stock market is crucial to create 
competitive environment with equal access to the 
market for different participants (investors, issuers, 
intermediaries, etc.) and monopoly prevention. 
As for the concrete steps, the following ones can 
be mentioned:
• abolition of discriminatory access conditions 
for the stock market participants at different 
levels and segments (issuers, organizers, mar-
ket intermediaries, depository and clearing 
institutions);
Figure 4. Lorenz curve for 2017
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Table 7. General results of concentration indicators analysis for the Ukrainian stock market (cases of 
2011 and 2017)
Indicator 2011 2017
Concentration ratio (CR1) Dominating companies Restricted oligopoly
Concentration ratio (CR4) Dominating companies Restricted oligopoly
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) Low concentration High concentration
Rosenbluth Index Low concentration High concentration
Comprehensive Concentration Index (ССІ) Low concentration High concentration
Entropy Index
A low level of uncertainty, and hence 
a high probability of the monopoly or 
oligopoly presence
A low level of uncertainty, and hence 
a high probability of the monopoly or 
oligopoly presence
Gini coefficient High concentration High concentration
Lorenz curve Insignificant market inequality Significant market inequality
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• effective coordination between different state 
authorities to provide effective competitive 
environment;
• further implementation of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as a ba-
sis for the openness and transparency of the 
stock market; 
• expansion of new financial instruments and 
products in the stock market (like new deriv-
atives to satisfy specific needs of the market 
participants);
• strengthening of the control over compliance 
with listing criteria, tariff policies and fair 
pricing in the market.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This paper examines competitiveness in the Ukrainian stock market over the period 2010–2017. Using 
data from the Ukrainian Exchange, the following hypothesis was tested: crisis decreases competitive-
ness in the stock market. To do this, traditional measurements of market concentration were used 
(Hirschman Index, Lerner Index, Comprehensive Concentration Index, Entropy Index, Gini coefficient, 
etc.), as well as some alternative methods like regression analysis with dummy variables and Kruskal-
Wallis test.
Strong evidences in favor of tested hypothesis are found. It can be concluded that market degradation is 
closely related with the level of competitiveness in the market and crisis in turn decreases competitive-
ness in the stock market.
The level of competitiveness in the Ukrainian stock market after crises changes dramatically. For the 
case of trade volumes, it almost turned into oligopoly and currently is divided between small numbers 
of issuers. Investment opportunities are limited with 3-4 positions of liquid stocks. As a result, it is 
mostly impossible to create a diversified investment portfolio. This negates the idea of investing in the 
Ukrainian stock market. And in such conditions, it is doomed. So appropriate measures and reforms 
are needed to change the situation.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1. Structure of the trades in the Ukrainian Exchange during 2010–2017 
Company 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
ALMK 8.6% 12.5% 11.1% 5.2% 1.7% 2.1% 0.4% 0.5%
AVDK 9.5% 9.8% 11.3% 5.3% 1.6% 0.9% 0.3% 0.0%
AZST 5.0% 5.3% 4.0% 4.7% 1.3% 2.3% 0.4% 0.0%
BAVL 3.4% 2.0% 3.8% 7.6% 11.4% 7.7% 14.8% 29.3%
CEEN 7.8% 10.1% 15.0% 9.4% 19.9% 29.0% 40.4% 25.9%
DNEN 0.4% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 1.2%
DNON 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 2.2%
DOEN 1.3% 2.1% 2.3% 4.5% 4.9% 3.8% 1.8% 1.3%
ENMZ 5.2% 5.0% 5.0% 4.2% 1.3% 1.0% 0.2% 0.0%
FARM 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.4%
KVBZ 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
LTPL 1.0% 0.7% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
LUAZ 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 1.2%
MSICH 7.7% 17.6% 24.2% 33.1% 33.6% 26.0% 17.1% 14.4%
SHCHZ 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 1.8%
SVGZ 2.2% 1.2% 0.9% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
SNEM 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7%
STIR 3.4% 2.3% 1.0% 0.7% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
TATM 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 1.4% 3.6%
SGOK 1.8% 1.6% 1.2% 1.0% 0.4% 0.6% 0.1% 0.0%
UNAF 15.2% 7.8% 3.0% 4.3% 11.8% 13.1% 9.7% 6.2%
USCB 7.2% 6.2% 6.3% 2.2% 0.4% 0.5% 1.0% 1.0%
UTLM 5.1% 3.2% 0.8% 0.9% 0.6% 3.0% 1.4% 1.2%
YASK 2.7% 2.2% 0.5% 0.6% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%
ZAEN 1.5% 0.4% 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6%
Others 9.3% 5.9% 7.6% 14.2% 9.5% 8.4% 9.3% 7.6%
Overall 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
APPENDIX B
Table В1. Transcription of the codes in listing (Ukrainian Exchange)
Code in listing Transcription 
ALMK Public joint stock company “Alchevsk Metallurgical Plant” 
AVDK Public joint stock company “Avdeevka coke plant”
AZST Public joint stock company “Azovstal”
BAVL Public joint stock company “Raiffeisen Bank Aval”
CEEN Public joint stock company “Centrenergo”
DNEN Public joint stock company “Dnyproenergo”
DNON Public joint stock company “DTEK Dnyprooblenergo”
DOEN Public joint stock company “Donbasenergo”
ENMZ Public joint stock company “Yenakiyevo Metallurgical Plant”
FARM Public joint stock company “Farmak”
KVBZ Public joint stock company “Kryukov Wagon Factory”
LTPL Public joint stock company “Luganskteplovoz”
LUAZ Public joint stock company “Bogdan Motors”
MSICH Public joint stock company “Motor Sich”
SHCHZ Public joint stock company “Shakhtoupravlinnye Pokrovske”
SVGZ Public joint stock company “Stakhanov Wagon Factory”
SNEM Public joint stock company “Nasosenergomash”
STIR Public joint stock company “Stirol”
TATM Public joint stock company “Turboatom”
SGOK Public joint stock company “Pivnichniy GOK”
UNAF Public joint stock company “Ukrnafta”
USCB Public joint stock company “Ukrsotsbank”
UTLM Public joint stock company “Ukrtelekom”
YASK Public joint stock company “Yasynivskyi coke plant”
ZAEN Public joint stock company “DTEK Zahidenergo”
